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ABSTRACT 
The domain of legal epistemology is defined from two alternative perspectives: 
individual epistemology and social epistemology. Since these perspectives have different objects 
of evaluation, their judgments privilege and exclude different sets of information. While 
methodological individualism is concerned with justified beliefs of individual knowers, the 
social angle focuses on the institutional conditions of knowledge. I will show that the 
information that is respectively excluded by both the individual and the social concepts of legal 
epistemology weaken their respective evaluations. With this in mind, I will explore one new 
option of defining legal epistemology. This alternative is more comprehensive, in the sense that 
integrates the information excluded by the aforementioned concepts. My intuition is that such an 
alternative is more accurate because it takes into account both legal agents and institutions. Since 
“the devil is in the details,” I will corroborate my thesis with two theories of legal epistemology, 
namely, Susan Haack’s and Alvin Goldman’s. The idea is to show that a proper function legal 
epistemology illuminates better the main epistemological problems of the field of law. 
 
  
This thesis is approved for recommendation 
to the Graduate Council. 
 
Thesis Director: 
_______________________________________ 
Dr. Jack Lyons 
 
Thesis Committee: 
_______________________________________ 
Dr. Thomas Senor 
_______________________________________ 
Dr. Jacob Adler 
_______________________________________ 
Dr. Jack Lyons 
 
  
THESIS DUPLICATION RELEASE 
I hereby authorize the University of Arkansas Libraries to duplicate this thesis when 
needed for research and/or scholarship. 
                
Agreed __________________________________________ 
Danny Marrero 
Refused __________________________________________ 
Danny Marrero 
  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ..…………………………………………………………………………… 1 
II. Individual Epistemology Vs. Social Epistemology: The Received View of Legal 
Epistemology .…………………………………………………………………………………… 5 
A. Individual Legal Epistemology ………………………………………………………. 5 
B. Social Legal Epistemology ………………………………………………………….. 13 
C. One Alternative Definition for Legal Epistemology: Previous Intuitions ……………15 
III. Foundherentism and Legal Epistemology ………..………………………………………... 18 
A. Science and Law ……………………………………………………………………. 21 
B. The Crossword Puzzle Analogy ……………………………………………………. 26 
C. Science and Law: Two Different Cognitive Enterprises …………………………… 33 
D. Disanalogies Between a Crossword Puzzle and Legal Knowledge ………………… 37 
IV. RELIABILISM AND LEGAL EPISTEMOLOGY …………….………………………….. 42 
A. The Nature of Epistemic Justification in the Field of Law …………………………. 45 
B. Social Legal Epistemology, Again …………………………………………………. 49 
C. Individual Epistemology v. Social Epistemology: A False Dilemma ……………… 52 
V. Cognitive agendas and legal epistemology ………………………………………………… 56 
A. Legal-Cognitive Agency ……………………………………………………………. 57 
B. Legal-Cognitive Agendas …………………………………………………………… 60 
C. Conclusion …………………………………………………………………………... 63 
WORKS CITED…………………………………………………………………………..……. 65 
1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Let me start placing the domain of legal epistemology (LE) at the intersection of two 
major areas of philosophical thought: epistemology and philosophy of law. With this in mind, I 
provisionally define LE as follows: 
Definition 1(Provisional LE): LE is a part of the philosophy of law which applies 
the methods and ideas of general epistemology (GE) taking into account cognitive 
processes in the field of law. 
This schematic definition requires some clarification. John Pollock and Joseph Cruz in 
Contemporary Theories of Knowledge suggest that the multiplicity of epistemic theories can be 
organized in accordance with the level of generalization in which they solve the main problems 
of epistemology (152). First, at the most abstract level, they place accounts that explain how 
knowledge in general is possible (e.g., foundationalism, coherentism or reliabilism). At an 
intermediate level, they classify theories which study the general cognitive procedures that 
contribute to epistemic processes (e.g., deduction and defeasible reasoning). Finally, at a more 
specific level, theories committed to the explanation of particular kinds of knowledge are placed 
(e.g., theories of perception, theories of the knowledge of other minds, epistemology of 
testimony, theories of mathematical knowledge). 
Showing the specific features of LE, I will use the traditional formula of propositional 
knowledge—“S knows that p”, where S is a cognitive agent, and p a fact or proposition. Since 
the acquisition of legal knowledge is highly regulated, I will show how the lawmaker 
accommodates this proposition. It is easier to start with p. Without details, GE understands p as a 
fact or proposition about the external world which could be true or false; for instance, “it is 
raining,” “the first time that Christopher Columbus came to the Americas was in 1942,” “I have 
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hands,” “if today were not Sunday, I would have gone to work,” or “I am not a brain in a vat.” 
For LE, p is determined by legal descriptions of the external world. Within this field, p stands for 
propositions such as “X murdered Y,” “this act was eminent domain,” “the government limited 
civil rights,” and so on. Legal epistemologists also interpret S restrictively. Whereas, in GE, 
philosophers focus on knowers in general, legal epistemologists study legal agents. 
Consequently, in this field, S is understood as participants in legal procedures such as judges, 
juries, prosecutors, plaintiffs, or detectives. Finally, the lawmaker also qualifies “knows”. For 
one thing, LE is not concerned with direct knowledge, or perception. To be sure, legal agents 
hardly ever perceive p, for instance ‘X murdered Y’. Instead of personal knowledge, legal agents 
know that p through information provided by partial indirect sources such as eyewitness 
testimonies, police testimonies, identification parades, or criminals’ confessions. On the other 
hand, legal knowledge is incomplete because the lawmaker imposes timeline constraints on legal 
agents. The legal principle: “justice delay is justice denied” provides an intuitive idea of these 
temporal restrictions. 
Going back to my preliminary definition, theories of LE have to fill in theories of GE. In 
Pollock and Cruz’s terminology, low-level theories have to fulfill a bottom-up condition. This 
means that a low-level of epistemic theorization should not be isolated from the top theories. 
Since the justification of knowledge in a particular area presupposes an account that explains 
how knowledge in general is possible, a condition for the correctness of low-level accounts is 
their consistency to the most abstract theories (193). With this in mind, I classify the most 
representative theories of LE in four main methodological orientations: Bayesian-based, 
Coherentism-based, Foundationalism-based, and Reliabilism-based.1As a preliminary 
presentation, Bayesianism suggests that a fact-finder’s belief for the existence of a fact is 
                                                     
1
 For a general overview see (Kaptein, Prakken and Verheij; Sinnott-Amstrong and Schauer). 
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justified when the evidence presented at trial increases this belief in a higher degree than the 
absence of such evidence. Foundationalism claims that a belief is justified if it is supported, 
directly or indirectly, by legal evidence. Coherentism states that events being litigated are 
justified if they cohere with the fact-finder’s background of beliefs and the evidence at trial. 
Finally, Reliabilism proposes that the accuracy of legal knowledge depends on the epistemic 
system in which this knowledge is achieved. As a consequence, it studies the truth-
conduciveness of legal procedures. 
Inaccordance with Pollock and Cruz, high-level epistemic theories have to be able to deal 
with knowledge about different subject matters. Hence, a criterion for the correctness of these 
theories is their capability to provide accounts for low-level theories. It is because of this 
requirement that low-level epistemic theories, such as LE, are a fruitful field of philosophical 
experimentation; for “[d]ifficulties in constructing the low-level theories should lead to 
modification of the high-level theory, or in extreme cases, to its abandonment” (193).A detailed 
evaluation of the main theories of LE is beyond the limited scope of this paper. Rather, I will 
adopt the following strategy. First, I will identify the concept of LE that the aforementioned 
theories adopt. Second, I will group these accounts into two alternatives, either the individual or 
the social concept of LE. Third, I will evaluate the informational bases of the epistemic 
judgments made by these alternatives.2 To be sure, Alvin Goldman in Epistemology and 
Cognition suggests that the “scope and direction of [epistemology] depend heavily on its objects 
                                                     
2
 The concept of ‘informational bases of judgements’ was created by Amartya Sen to evaluate 
theories of justice. In this case, he studies “the variables that are directly involved in assessing 
the justice of alternative systems or arrangements” (Inequality Reexamined 73). For instance, 
while the utilitarian approach is centralized in individual happiness, some economical analyses 
privilege personal income, and libertarian theories put their focal point in the basic social 
liberties. From his view, a deep analytical evaluation of the theories of justice not only should 
recognize what that theory has, but also what that theory lacks (Rights and Capabilities 130). 
This is the idea to be applied in this paper. 
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of evaluation. Which things are to be evaluated?” (3-4). Choosing their objects, theories of 
epistemology depend on specific sets of information, and they are independent of other groups of 
information. While methodological individualism depends on the evidence legal agents have, the 
social angle is dependent on the institutional processes of acquisitions of legal knowledge. 
Whereas individual LE is independent from legal institutions, social LE is free from the internal 
epistemic aspects of legal agents. I will show that the information that is respectively excluded 
by both the individual and the social concepts of LE weaken their respective evaluations. With 
this in mind, I will explore a new option; I will propose a proper function LE. My intuition is that 
such an alternative is more accurate because it takes into account both legal agents and 
institutions. I will present this general intuition in Chapter 1.Since “the devil is in the details,” I 
will corroborate my thesis with two theories of LE, namely, Susan Haack’s (Chapter 2) and 
Alvin Goldman’s (Chapter 3). The idea is to show that a proper function legal epistemology 
illuminates better the main epistemological problems of the field of law (Chapter 4). 
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II. INDIVIDUAL EPISTEMOLOGY VS. SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY: THE RECEIVED 
VIEW OF LEGAL EPISTEMOLOGY 
 
The domain of LE is defined from two alternative perspectives: individual epistemology 
and social epistemology. Since these perspectives have different objects of evaluation, their 
judgments privilege and exclude different sets of information. While methodological 
individualism is concerned with justified beliefs of individual knowers, the social angle focuses 
on the institutional conditions of knowledge. I will show that the information that is respectively 
excluded, by both the individual and the social concepts of LE, weaken their respective 
evaluations. I will explore one new option of defining LE. This view is more comprehensive in 
the sense that it integrates the information excluded by the aforementioned concepts. The 
strategy will be to dissolve the individual/social dichotomy with a definition which includes both 
legal agents and institutions. 
 
A. Individual Legal Epistemology 
 
When a legally established tribunal has to make decisions, for instance, whether X is 
guilty of murdering Y, it is expected that it justifiably believes in the facts which could support 
that decision: “Y died,” “Y was stabbed to death,” “X was with Y when Y died,” “Y was 
murdered by X,” and so on. Such justification does not come from direct knowledge, for the fact-
finder does not perceive the events under discussion. Better yet, the parties involved in the 
lawsuit provide the evidence required. But, when is it rational for the trier of fact to believe 
events being litigated? From this concern arises the first academic definition of LE: 
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Definition 2 (LEI1): LE is a part of the philosophy of law that studies the 
conditions under which the fact-finder’s beliefs are justified at trial. 
Since this definition adopts the perspective of one of the participants in legal procedures, namely, 
judges or jurors, this is an individual definition of LE. However, this is not the only individual 
theory of LE. That is why I put “I1” after LE. It means that it is the first version of one individual 
definition of LE. 
Chronologically speaking, LEI1 arose from the debate about the role that Bayesian modes 
of inference could play in understanding the law and determining facts at trial. To contextualize, 
Richard Lempert, in The New Evidence Scholarship, suggests the studies of legal evidence have 
changed from providing simple legislative comments to complex explanations of how fact-
finders process evidence. From his perspective, this change is the academic reaction to two legal 
events, namely, the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE), enacted in 1975, and the case The People 
v. Malcolm Ricardo Collins, 1968 (439).1 
On one hand, FRE suggested a probabilistic interpretation of the law, mostly because of 
its concept of relevant evidence. “‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having the tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence” (Rule 401). 
On the other hand, in People v. Collins, the Supreme Court of California rejected the 
strategy of a prosecutor using mathematical statistics to identify a couple charged with second 
degree robbery. Briefly, the prosecutor used the expert testimony of an instructor of mathematics 
at a state college to show that “there was an overwhelming probability that the crime was 
committed by any couple answering the distinctive characteristics of the defendant and his wife” 
                                                     
1
 William Twining in Rethinking Evidence suggests that Lempert oversimplifies the origin of LE 
(245). Twining seems to be right, but for the expositive purposes of this part, Lempert’s account 
suffices. 
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(500). The Court denied this argument because the prosecutor did not provide any justification 
for the use of the aforementioned statistics and because “under the circumstances, the ‘trial by 
mathematics’ so distorted the role of the jury and so disadvantaged counsel for the defense, as to 
constitute in itself, a miscarriage of justice” (502). 
When these events were taken into account, scholars adopted positions, both pro and con, 
regarding the use of Bayesian models to explain legal fact-finding. Lempert declares himself 
“agnostic” about those extreme positions (450). However, he suggests that the critics have to 
offer alternative theories in the main areas in which Bayesianism is used (i.e., as a normative 
model that evaluates epistemic status and as an account that describes the legal processing of 
information). To be sure, Bayesianism suggests that it is rational for the trier of facts to believe 
events being litigated when his/her belief about the alleged facts has a higher probability than 
his/her previous beliefs about the same facts. This change of doxastic states, or updating of 
beliefs, is triggered by new evidence presented at trial (Goodman, “Quasi-objective Bayesianism 
and Legal Evidence” 239-241). 
Critics of Bayesianism attack both, the descriptive accuracy, and the normative utility of 
this theory. The most important source of this criticism is studies of empirical psychology which 
show that legal agents are not natural Bayesian reasoners. For instance, Lance Bennett and 
Martha Feldman conducted an ethnographic study to understand how justice is actually done by 
ordinary people in criminal trials (3).These researchers observed more than sixty criminal trials 
in the Supreme Court of the state of Washington in King County (Seattle) for one year. This is 
their description of the method. 
Our observation of a trial normally involved much more than merely watching the 
proceedings. We generally arrived at the courthouse early in order to see the cast 
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of characters assemble and prepare for the day. This proved a valuable strategy 
for catching bits of conversations about the case. It was useful to hear lawyers 
chatting among themselves, to observe discussions between lawyers and their 
clients and witnesses, and to hear the dialogues between jurors as they arrived at 
the courtroom in the morning or after lunch. We spent hours sitting in the 
hallways watching the parade of participants come and go […] We were fortunate 
to be able to have both structured and unstructured opportunities to discuss cases 
with participants […] This extensive feedback network made it possible to gain 
different perspectives about what was going on in a trial and to elicit immediate 
reactions to our hypothesis about what implicit practices organized judgment and 
communication in the courtroom. (11-12) 
Two relevant conclusions were drawn from this study. Firstly, criminal trials are 
organized around storytelling (i.e., the parts under litigation have different versions—stories—of 
the alleged facts, and the trier of fact listens to these narratives and decides which is better). 
Secondly, the structure of legal reasoning is the structure of a story (e.g., introduction, climax 
and denouement). 
Such story telling models of legal decision making were also put under experimentation 
with controlled conditions by Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie. The results of their 
experiments show that legal evidence articulated in coherent stories increases the credibility of 
the evidence. Furthermore, it has a positive impact in the memory of the jury. Finally, it shows 
that judgment processes follow the prescriptions of story-telling models and not the rules of 
Bayesian inference (Pennington and Hastie 193-202). 
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Supported by empirical results like this, non-Bayesian accounts of LE were proposed. 
Coherentists suggest that a belief about facts being litigated is justified if it coheres with both the 
fact-finder’s background beliefs and the evidence presented at trial (Amaya, “Justification, 
Coherence, and Epistemic Responsibility in Legal Fact-Finding.” 307).2 Explanationists claim 
that a fact-finder is rational in believing that the alleged facts occurred when this belief is 
generated from the litigant’s narrative that better explains the evidence at trial (e.g., Allen 325-
327; Allen and Pardo 233-242; Thagard 234-237). 
Despite the fruitful debate for and against Bayesianism, which LEI1 has boosted in the 
field of law, this definition has been criticized because of its limited view. For one thing, 
considering that the focal point of LEI1’s evaluations are the fact-finder’s beliefs, this definition 
excludes the epistemic perspective of other participants in legal procedures. For the other, 
because LEI1limitsits evaluations to trial, it does not include cognitive tasks performed in other 
procedural stages. However, the legal inquiry for the truth is not limited to trial. 
To show the complexity which LE has to face, four interconnected variables are useful: 
the roles performed by legal agents, the stages of legal procedures, the information available for 
legal inquiry, and the plans of action adopted by legal agents (Anderson, Schum and Twining 
115-116). To be sure, when an individual becomes a legal agent, he/she adopts different 
epistemic goals in accordance with his/her role. For instance, while it is expected that a plaintiff 
or a petitioner looks for the evidence that strengthens his/her position, a fact-finder ought to 
decide about the events under consideration, and an expert who testifies at trial might provide 
                                                     
2
 LE departs from GE in this point. From the general view, ‘coherence’ is understood as a 
probabilistic term (Plantinga 114-131). In the field of LE, it is thought that ‘coherentism’ and 
‘probabilism’ are incompatible accounts (Allen 320; Allen and Brian 1527-1537; Allen and 
Pardo 247-261; Amaya, “Justification, Coherence and Epistemic Responsibility in Legal Fact-
Finding” 307; Haack, “Epistemology Legalized” 48-49, Thagard 232; Twining “Rethinking 
Evidence” 245). 
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technical information. These general roles are specified by the procedural stage in which they are 
performed. To illustrate, whereas advocates in civil adversarial procedures might defeat their 
counterpart if they are at trial, in the pretrial stage of discovery of evidence, they have to disclose 
all the relevant information in their possession. It does not matter if this information is favorable 
or unfavorable for who discloses it. The information available for legal agents limits their roles 
even more. That is why a defendant could accept a plea bargain when he/she believes the 
prosecutor has enough evidence to determine his/her responsibility for a crime. Finally, legal 
agents’ plans of actions also limit their epistemic ends; for instance, the grades of certainty, 
information required, and the belief to be justified change if a prosecutor is going to negotiate in 
a plea bargain or if he/she is going to accuse. To conclude, although it is true that the ultimate 
decision about the facts under litigation is made by either a jury or a judge, a theory of LE has to 
be able to deal with beliefs and evidence-handling of all the participants in legal procedures 
(Twining, “Some Scepticism about some Scepticism” 131). 
This requirement leads to a new and widened definition of LE: 
Definition 3 (LEI2): LE is a part of the philosophy of law which studies the 
conditions under which the legal agents’ beliefs are justified in the different 
contexts of litigation understood as a total process (i.e., pre-trial, trial and appeal). 
Under this definition, LE seems to understand the complexity of legal practices. LE’s object is 
not only the justified beliefs that support the fact-finder’s ultimate decision. Rather, LE scholars 
should study the beliefs of several kinds of agents who make different decisions related to their 
own duties and roles. 
Facing this diversity, legal foundationalism claims that a belief is justified in the field of 
law if it is supported, directly or indirectly, by the legal evidence a legal agent has. Even though 
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one can identify different positions here, most of them admit to be inspired by William 
Wigmore’s charts of evidence (747-756).3I will present Wigmore’s charts with the simplified 
version of Terence Anderson, David Schum and William Twining in Analysis of Evidence (90-
98; 136-139). To start with, the foundation of factual argumentation is the proposition which 
both establishes the evidence data introduced in the procedure and does not need justification. 
Following Wigmore’s terminology, the factum probans. Two types of evidence are introduced in 
legal procedures: testimonial assertions made by witnesses (e.g., one witness, W1, states “I saw a 
person with characteristics a, b, c, and d enter Y’s house at 4:15 p.m. on January 1.” Another 
witness, W2, asserts “I saw X running out of Y’s house at 4:45 p.m. on January 1.” Finally, W3 
states “On Christmas Day, I heard X say angrily to Y: ‘I shall not forget this’”), and physical 
evidence (e.g., The person X has characteristics a, b, c, and d. Or, Y died at 4:30 on January 1 at 
his house). Secondly, there is a group of propositions that is inferred from the evidence; this is 
the factum probandum. Two sorts of propositions are drawn here. The first one is the ultimate 
probandum, an argument’s final conclusion, or belief to be justified (e.g., It was X who 
murdered Y). Since it is hardly ever possible to infer this proposition directly from the factum 
probans, intermediate propositions, or intermediate probanda, are required to connect the 
evidence with the belief to be justified. This is shown in Figure 1. In this diagram, the 
connections between those propositions are specified by arrows that above them, have an 
inferred proposition, and below them the source of this inference. 
 
 
                                                     
3
 The most important foundationalism theories are the Information-in-litigation Movement 
(Twining, Rethinking Evidence), the theory of the argumentative dialogue (Walton), the theory 
of defeasible reasoning (Prakken and Sartor) and the legal foundherentism (Haack “Warrant, 
Causation, and the Atomism of Evidence Law”).  
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Figure 1: Example of Wigmore’s Chart of Evidence 
Ultimate Probandum 
“It was X who murdered Y.” 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 Intermediate Probandum 5 
X had the opportunity to murder Y. 
 Intermediate 
Probandum 7 
X had a motive to 
murder Y. 
 
 
    
 Intermediate 
Probandum 3 
X was in Y’s house 
at 4:30 p.m. on 
January 1. 
   
 
 
    
Intermediate Probandum 2 
It was X who entered Y’s house 
at 4:15 p.m. on January 1. 
    
 
 
    
Intermediate Probandum 1 
A person with characteristics a, 
b, c, and d entered Y’s house at 
4:15 p.m. on January 1. 
 Intermediate 
Probandum 4 
X exited Y’s house 
at 4:45 p.m. on 
January 1.” 
 Intermediate 
Probandum 6 
X was angry with Y 
on Christmas Day. 
 
 
    
Factum Probans 1 
(Testimonial 
Assertion) 
W1: “I saw a person 
with characteristics 
a, b, c, and d enter 
Y’s house at 4:15 
p.m. on January 1.” 
Factum Probans 2 
(Fact) 
X has characteristics 
a, b, c, and d. 
Factum Probans 3 
(Testimonial 
Assertion) 
W2: “I saw X 
running out of Y’s 
house at 4:45 p.m. 
on January 1.” 
Factum Probans 4 
(Fact) 
Y died at 4:30 on 
January 1, at his 
house. 
Factum Probans 5 
(Testimonial 
Assertion) 
W3: “On Christmas 
Day, I heard X say 
angrily to Y: ‘I shall 
not forget this.’” 
 
Twining suggests that the virtue of these chains of evidence is their level of abstraction 
(“Rethinking Evidence” 241). Since this tool is not a constitutive feature of cognitive agents, one 
can transfer it from one legal agent’s evidence to the other’s. Besides, this operation can be 
repeated along the different stages of litigation—pretrial, trial and appeal. In accordance with 
Twining, this level of generality makes exhaustive epistemic evaluations of all kinds of legal 
agents possible, within their own standpoints. 
13 
 
 
B. Social Legal Epistemology 
 
Even though LEI2 is right, showing that legal procedures have different sorts of cognitive 
agents, the participant-oriented perspective is inappropriate. LEI2’s methodology implies the 
isolation of legal agents; therefore, legal agents’ interactions are beyond the scope of this 
definition. Still, legal knowledge is only achieved with the interactions between legal agents. For 
instance, a prosecutor knows the facts that support the accusation after he/she interacts with the 
police detectives and other sources of legal knowledge. Similarly, a plaintiff has to interact 
properly with his/her witnesses if he/she wants to succeed at trial. Finally, a trier of facts, either 
judge or jury, receives the evidence from the parts under litigation. 
Taking into account these interactions, an alternative angle of LE departs from the 
individual view and suggests a social approach. From this view, legal procedures are epistemic 
systems “that house social practices, procedures, institutions and or patterns of interpersonal 
influence that affect the epistemic outcomes of its members”(Goldman, “A Guide to Social 
Epistemology” 18).Consider the main Western designs of adjudication, namely, the adversarial 
and the inquisitorial systems. While in the adversarial structure the inquiry is performed by the 
litigants (i.e., prosecutor v. defense or plaintiff v. defendant) who present their cases to a trier of 
facts (i.e., either a jury or a judge); in the non-adversarial procedure, the evidence-handling and 
determination is a trier of facts’ responsibility. Accordingly, the epistemic aim of truth-
determination varies in each system. In the adversarial procedure, this objective is attained when, 
for example, the respective legal institutions prevent, or minimize, the truth-distorting 
recollection of evidence by the parts under litigation. Alternatively, an inquisitorial procedure is 
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truth-conducive if, within other things, its design avoids fact-finders’ preconceptions and 
promotes a complete inquiry of the alleged facts (Damaška 120-122). Assuming this, the 
definition of LE adopted by this social (S) approach is: 
Definition 4(LES): LE is a part of the philosophy of law which examines whether 
legal procedures are conducive to their epistemic aims. 
A good instantiation of LES is Laudan’s book Truth, Error and Criminal Law: An Essay 
in Legal Epistemology. Here he suggests that an ideal criminal procedure is an “epistemic 
engine” (2), for justice is only achievable through this procedure if there is a correspondence 
between its fact-finding and the external world. In other words, an ideal criminal procedure is a 
cognitive process which starts with some factual “clues and indications” and ends with a decision 
made by a tribunal in which factual considerations reflect what really happened. As a 
consequence, all the constitutive parts of criminal procedures should be truth-conducive. 
Unfortunately, bad designs of criminal procedures bring this “engine” to a standstill. Discovering 
and fixing these problems is the task of LE because, according to Laudan, it is a kind of applied 
epistemology and this “is the study of whether systems of investigation that purport to be seeking 
the truth are well engineered to lead to true beliefs about the world” (2). Two tasks, therefore, 
have to be accomplished by LE. First, in a diagnosis stage, it has to determine “which existing 
rules promote and which thwart truth seeking”. Second, in a therapeutic stage, it has to propose“ 
changes in existing rules to eliminate or modify those rules that turn out to be serious obstacles 
in finding the truth” (3). 
Even though the institutional view of LES has a rich seam for epistemic exploration, 
something seems to be left out by this theory. LES focuses on the evaluation of the structure of 
legal procedures as epistemic systems. Consequently, this perspective does not evaluate the 
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epistemic performances of legal agents in the achievement of their legal duties. Yet, if legal 
knowledge is a consequence of the interaction of different legal agents, LE should also evaluate 
individual performances because they could standstill or accelerate the legal epistemic engine. 
Let us follow Laudan’s thought experiment and imagine a criminal procedure perfectly 
truth-conducive, that is, a system whose constitutive rules straightly conduct epistemic aims such 
as truth seeking and error avoidance (4-9). Even in this ideal scenario, it is possible that legal 
agents interpret wrongly the procedural legislation. Furthermore, they could perform their 
epistemic duties poorly. Hence, the longed for epistemic goals would be frustrated. Laudan 
wrongly thinks the main cause of epistemic failures in legal procedures is the legislative designs. 
I mean […] that many of the rules and procedures regulating criminal trials in the 
United States […] are themselves the cause of many incorrect verdicts. I mean, 
too, that the standard of proof relevant to criminal cases, beyond reasonable 
doubt, is abysmally unclear to all those–jurors, judges, and attorneys–whose task 
is to see that those standards are honored. (4) 
However, the epistemic practices of legal agents also have to be evaluated. In conclusions, LE 
not only should assess legal institutions, but also legal practices. 
 
C. One Alternative Definition for Legal Epistemology: Previous Intuitions 
 
So far, I have shown the two main concepts of LE–individual and social. Each of these 
definitions determines both the information that should be included and the information excluded 
from their respective epistemic judgments. Whereas the participant-oriented perspective 
proposes that LE evaluates the rationality of beliefs about facts held by all participants in legal 
16 
 
procedures, the social-oriented perspective includes the epistemic virtues and failures of legal 
procedures. While LEI1 and 2 exclude from the analysis both social interactions and epistemic 
outcomes of legal evidence-handling systems, LES overlooks the ways in which legal agents 
implement and develop their epistemic ends. My evaluation is that LEI2 provides good reasons 
for adopting an individual view of LE. Nevertheless, it lacks reasons for excluding the 
institutional angle from epistemic judgments. Similarly, LES has good reasons for the social-
oriented appraisal, yet it omits a strong support for the exclusion of the participant-oriented 
evaluation. The informational discrimination of these two definitions shows the conceptual 
problems of the received view. Plainly, its concepts of LE exclude elements which have to be 
taken into account. As a consequence, I believe that the most reasonable alternative is redefining 
LE, including the elements excluded from the main concepts studied in this section. 
My intuition is that such a comprehensive definition is possible with a concept of 
cognitive agent that incorporates the institutional elements overlooked by LEI1 and 2. 
Participants in legal procedures are not institutionally-independent individuals ─“pure” 
individuals so to speak. This is because they are imbued with institutional purposes and time 
constrictions. But they are neither institutional entities because their degrees of command of 
resources and the cognitive aims they seek to achieve can either accelerate or obstruct the 
consecution of their legal epistemic aims. To be sure, following the Practical Logic of Cognitive 
Systems of John Woods and Dov Gabbay, I will understand a cognitive agent as a kind of 
“information-processor” with a cognitive agenda or “program of action”, that he/she is 
constrained to close, dealing with his resources (i.e., time, information and computational 
capacity) (The Reach of Abduction11-10). Accordingly, a legal-cognitive agent is an 
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information-processor whose agenda is legally determined, has procedural timeline constrictions 
and seeks and computes information that allows him/her advances or closes his/her agenda. 
With this new understanding of cognitive agents, I define LE as follows: 
Definition 5 (LE): LE is a part of the philosophy of law which studies the 
conditions under which legal agents close their cognitive agendas. 
This definition includes the elements overlooked by LEI2 and LES, for it incorporates both legal 
agents and legal institutions. Besides, it provides a general concept of LE which integrates the 
methodological programs of individual epistemology and social epistemology. This general 
hypothesis will be corroborated with the individual LE of Susan Haack and the social LE of 
Alvin Goldman. After this, the main characteristics of my alternative will be developed.  
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III. FOUNDHERENTISM AND LEGAL EPISTEMOLOGY 
 
As everyone knows, the law faces several epistemic problems. In accordance with Susan 
Haack, a non-restrictive list of epistemic issues includes the following questions (Q): 
Q1. What are the coincidences and divergences between the concept of legal and 
epistemic evidence? 
Q2. Can epistemology illuminate legal concepts such as reasonable doubt, the 
weight of evidence, the preponderance of evidence, etc.? 
Q3. Can epistemology provide some clarification for the debate between the 
“fact-based”, or Bayesian, and the “story-based”, or coherentist, approaches 
of legal evidence? 
Q4. Is the adversarial legal procedure truth-conducive? 
Q5. Are the exclusionary rules of evidence epistemologically desirable? 
(“Epistemology Legalized” 48-49) 
So far, nothing is new. What really strikes me is Haack’s discrimination of these questions. She 
distinguished two features within them. On one hand, whereas (Q1) – (Q3) are easy questions, 
(Q4) and (Q5) have an outstanding level of difficulty: “these questions are relatively small 
potatoes compared to the radical epistemological criticisms of adversarialism, and of 
exclusionary rules of evidence” which are “not-so-small -and probably uncomfortably hot- 
epistemologico-legal potatoes” (49). On the other hand, (Q1) and (Q3) are epistemologically 
answerable, but (Q2), (Q4) and (Q5) are not. Some detail is needed for the understanding of this 
second point. 
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Although legal evidence is narrower than epistemic evidence because the law is only 
concerned with the evidence in the legal procedure, it is clear that epistemology illuminates 
problems of justified beliefs (48). Consequently, (Q1) can be taken into an epistemic account. 
This answerability is confirmed by the contribution which foundherentism could provide for 
(Q3). “Though the vocabulary is different, the ideas are essentially similar: the “fact-based” 
approach is foundationalist in structure and spirit, the “story-based” approach coherentist; and 
foundherentism shows that we can combine the strengths, and avoid the weaknesses, of both 
theories” (48-49). 
These two questions contrast with the intractability of (Q2), (Q4) and (Q5). Let me 
separate (Q2) from (Q4) and (Q5) in two different groups because the reasons which impede 
epistemology from offering answers for these questions are different in each group. Specifically, 
whereas (Q2) cannot be answered because of the limits, or maybe the virtues, of Haack’s theory, 
(Q4) and (Q5) cannot be answered by any theory of LE. From my view, (Q2) is moderately 
unanswerable, but (Q4) and (Q5) are radically unanswerable. I will explore the radical option 
first. 
Why can no theory of LE provide answers for (Q4) and (Q5)? The core of Haack’s 
argument is the nature of epistemic evaluations. Epistemology is only able to solve problems 
related to epistemic values such as “honesty about what the evidence is and what it shows” 
(“Irreconcilable Differences?” 9). If one issue does not have epistemic values, or its epistemic 
values are combined with non-epistemic values, it cannot be rationally expected that 
epistemology illuminates it. Consequently, (Q4) and (Q5) are epistemologically unanswerable 
“because they involve value judgments of other kinds,” and they “are beyond the reach of purely 
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epistemological argument” (“Epistemology Legalized” 44). For this reason, and after trying to 
deal with those “hot and uncomfortable epistemological-legal potatoes”, Haack states: 
Hence my conclusion: “The American Way” -the way of adversarialism and of 
exclusionary rules- is not an inherently bad way to determine the truth in legal 
disputes; but as it presently works it isn’t nearly as good a way as we would 
ideally like it to be. In general, of course, what legal way of determining the truth 
will work best at a given place or time is likely to depend in complicated ways on 
matters of history, culture, economics, and social mores; and for our legal system 
to work significantly better would probably take changes not only within the 
system itself, but also in the larger social context in which it operates. But I will 
end here; for it really is beyond the competence of a “person of mere theory” like 
myself to offer detailed proposals about how such improvements, so desirable 
from the point of view of justice, might be achieved. (“Epistemology Legalized” 
61) 
This step back seems prudent provided that legal institutions such as the adversarial system do 
not have as ultimate goal to seek the truth. Assuming this, Haack, as epistemologist, should not 
evaluate the law. But, why does Haack think legal institutions lack that epistemic value? This 
question is important because it delimits the scope of LE. Due to, both, the importance of the 
questions and the complexity of the answer, it will be the focus of the next section. However, 
what has been said suffices for intuitively understanding why (Q4) and (Q5) are radically 
unanswerable. 
Before finishing this general introduction, I will explain why (Q2) is trivially 
unanswerable. As it was shown in the previous chapter, due to the concept of relevant evidence 
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established by FRE, there is a consolidated probabilistic interpretation in the field of law. If 
someone expects Haack to interpret epistemic-legal concepts in this sense, then (Q2) cannot be 
answered from her theory. She states: 
So my answers will not be couched in probabilistic terms. My answer will draw, 
instead, on the account of the structure of evidence and the determinants of 
evidential quality I developed in Evidence and Inquiry, and refined and amplified 
in Defending Science –Within Reason. (Haack, “Warrant, Causation, and the 
Atomism of Evidence Law” 256-257) 
I will show how Haack applies her foundherentism to the field of law in the first two 
sections of this chapter. In sections C and D, I will criticize Haak’s ideas, and show how my 
proper function LE could solve the problems posited by Haack’s theory. 
 
A. Science and Law 
 
Why do legal procedures lack epistemological values? Haack’s arguments can be 
reconstructed with the next propositions (P): 
P1. If the core business of one activity is not inquiry, then the core values of that 
activity are not epistemic. 
P2. The core business of law is not inquiry. 
Therefore, 
P3. The core values of law are not epistemic. 
Haack infers (P1) from the concept of ‘inquiry’. Broadly speaking, “inquiry is an attempt to 
discover the truth of some question or questions” (“Epistemology Legalized” 45). The starting 
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point, hence, is a question which perturbs a cognitive agent. In solving this issue, he/she 
formulates one hypothesis and starts looking for evidence which confirms it. Not having 
confirmation, the agent either modifies or abandons his/her initial conjecture. When the evidence 
leads to the true answer under consideration, the inquirer’s aim is achieved. This tracking of the 
evidence for the sake of the truth takes for granted epistemic virtues. For instance, it implies 
originality in formulating hypotheses, persistency in looking for evidence, honesty with what the 
evidence shows, and so on. Though inquiry is an everyday activity, it is the professional activity 
of “scientists, historians, detectives, investigative journalists, of legal and literary scholars, and 
of philosophers, among others.” However, there are activities whose core is not inquiry such as 
“cooking dinner, composing a symphony, dancing, debating, or pleading a case before the 
Supreme Court” (45). For the sake of the discussion, the goal of cooking is to produce an edible 
meal, the aim of dancing is to move the body to the beat of the music, and the objective of 
pleading is to win a case. From Haack’s view, since these activities are not directed to discover 
the truth, then the core values of these activities are not epistemic. 
It is commonly accepted that inquiry is a constitutive part of legal systems because the 
justice that they want to achieve depends on two sides of the same coin. On one side, justice is 
conditioned by the application and administration of just laws. On the other side, it is a 
consequence of the truth determination of legally relevant facts. Therefore, the law also is one 
activity whose core is inquiry. Haack counterargues this position juxtaposing science and law. 
Since the core of science is inquiry, it provides an archetype which law would fulfill if its core 
were inquiry as well. Yet law does not conform to science: “If the legal system were in the same 
business as history, geography, or as physics and the other sciences, its way of conducting that 
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business would be peculiar, and inefficient, to say the least. But the law is really not in exactly 
the same business” (“Irreconcilable Differences?” 13). 
The main differences between science and law are the following (see table 1). First, the 
equation of the three main elements of the concept of inquiry (i.e., question, evidence and 
answer) is different in science and law. A scientific method starts with a question which 
encourages the search for evidence that could provide an answer for the original issue. Although 
legal procedures also start with a question, unlike science, legal agents first provide answers to 
their initial questions and then look for the evidence which supports their position.4 Second, the 
aim of science is to formulate, examine and answer questions which explain how the world 
works. Alternatively, a legal procedure is a non-violent social means of conflict resolution. To be 
sure, the legal procedure is aimed to produce a verdict of guilt or liability according to a body of 
evidence. This decision ends a dispute between two adversarial parts (e.g., prosecutors v. 
attorneys, or petitioners v. respondents). Third, the interest of science is not only to solve a 
question, but provide explanations for phenomena. Hence, the object of science is general laws 
which explain particular cases. Legal procedures, instead, attain their goals through particular 
cases. Fourth, when scientific results seem to be unsatisfactory under new evidence, scientists 
                                                     
4
 The expression ‘questions’ is differently interpreted in science and law. Scientific questions are 
more abstract and look for one explanation. Legal questions are specific and bolster particular 
legal positions. Haack illustrates the difference as follows: 
Because they are specific to a particular case or individual, the questions to which 
the legal system needs answers are rarely exactly the questions on which the 
relevant scientific work would ordinarily focus. There may, for example, be solid 
scientific work on the distribution of a disease or disorder in the population as a 
whole, and reasonable theories about its etiology, but there is unlikely to be 
scientific work directly relevant to whether this risk factor was a significant cause 
of this person's contracting the disease. Or, as in the case of forensic identification 
by DNA, where the relevant science is very well-warranted indeed, its application 
to the samples from this crime scene and this defendant introduces a whole raft of 
opportunities for corner-cutting, sloppiness, self-deception, and plain dishonesty. 
(“Of Truth, in Science and in the Law” 1002-1003) 
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wonder about the problems of their partial results and, if it is necessary, those are modified. In 
this sense, science is fallible. In contrast, the satisfaction of legal resolutions implies both prompt 
and definite verdicts. For one thing, extremely slow justice is not justice; for the other, constantly 
modified verdicts conduct to legal insecurity. In addition, double jeopardy should be avoided. 
Fifth, science is progressive whereas law is conservative. To clarify, scientific problem-solving 
dynamics are reiterative because once a scientific question is solved, a new issue is posited. This 
leads to progressivism because, normally, the new questions are analyzed and answered using 
previous results. This contrasts to the importance of the precedent for legal decision making. 
Circumventing the atomism of their case-based orientation, legal systems unify verdicts using 
previous judicial decisions as patterns for future decisions. Finally, scientific investigation is free 
from formalities while law establishes rituals for the resolution of social conflicts. In other 
words, in their investigations, scientists do not use standardized protocols. What is important is 
the explanatory power of their theories, not the way through which they construct them. Legal 
resolution of conflicts, on the contrary, homogenizes legal behavior through legal procedures. If 
legal agents do not follow the procedural itinerary, they cannot achieve their objectives 
(“Irreconcilable Differences?” 7-15; “Epistemology Legalized” 45-50; “Inquiry and Advocacy” 
205-208). 
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Table 1: Juxtaposition between Law and Science 
Science … Law … 
… formulates a question, looks for evidence, and 
answers the question. 
… searches for the truth. 
… has investigative character. 
… searches for general principles. 
… has a pervasively fallibilism (i.e., is open to 
revision in the light of new evidence). 
… pushes for innovation. 
… has unlimited time for solving a problem. 
… has informal and problem-oriented investigation. 
…formulates a question, answers the question and look for 
the evidence which support this answer. 
… determines a defendant’s guilt or liability. 
… has adversarial culture. 
… focuses on particular cases. 
… is concerned with prompt and final resolutions. 
 
… defers to the precedent. 
… has strong timeline constrictions. 
… relies on formal rules and procedures. 
 
Someone could reply to Haack’s differentiation by asserting that she is overlooking the 
investigative instances of legal procedures. Though the trial is the core of legal procedures, this 
could not be understood as a scientific investigation. However, trials are preceded by one 
investigative stage in which detectives, the FBI, the police, attorneys for each side, and their 
investigators look for evidence in determining the facts under discussion. Haack rebuts this 
objection, suggesting that neither police detectives nor legal, private investigators can be 
considered inquirers in the same sense as historians, investigative journalists or physicists. In 
performing their legal investigations, the detectives and legal investigators have two concerns 
that bias their activity: they ought to obtain evidence in such a way that it would be admissible in 
court (“Irreconciliable Differences?” 9, note 51), and they have the obligation of making the best 
possible case for their client’s side of the dispute (13). 
This argument leads to the conclusion that legal systems do not have as ultimate goal to 
seek the truth. Recall that this proposition rules out the competence of LE from answering 
questions such as (Q4) and (Q5). If this is true, LE should be concerned with questions such as 
(Q1), (Q2) and (Q3). So far, I have mentioned Haack’s general strategy for solving these 
questions. Namely, instead of using calculus of probabilities, she studies the structure of 
evidence in the spirit of Evidence and Inquiry and Defending Science –Within Reason. That is, 
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she uses the metaphor of the crossword puzzle to explain the structure of justified beliefs in the 
field of law. Now I will present the details of this account. 
 
B. The Crossword Puzzle Analogy 
 
The best way to present Haack’s account is through a question that has the same features 
of (Q1), (Q2) or (Q3) (i.e., an epistemic issue for the field of law which can be answered by LE 
within the frame of GE). Haack formulates such a question in the following terms, “Whether and 
if so, when and why, a congeries of diverse pieces of evidence can warrant a conclusion better 
than any of its elements alone” (“Warrant, Causation, and the Atomism of Evidence Law” 253; 
“Providing Causation” 261). In accordance to Haack, to answer this question, it is required to 
“determine whether, and to what degree, evidence warrants a conclusion” (“Warrant, Causation, 
and the Atomism of Evidence Law” 253). In other words, the issue of justified beliefs comes 
prior to the question of the conjoint evidence. If one understands what a justified belief is, one 
can understand why and when conjoint evidence provides better support for a belief than 
individual pieces of evidence. To show how this strategy illuminates problems of legal 
epistemology, let me reconstruct one of the legal cases cited by Haack: Mary Virginia Oxendine 
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
Without entering into the specific procedural details, the main issue of the case is the 
liability of the pharmaceutical company for the birth defects of Mary Virginia Oxendine. To 
expand, Mary’s mom, being pregnant with Mary, took Bendectin. This medicine, manufactured 
by Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., was originally designed to alleviate the nausea which 
commonly accompanies pregnancy, yet it allegedly caused Mary to be born with a shortened 
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right forearm and only three fingers which were fused together on her right hand. The defendant 
denied such causal relation as strategy against his liability (Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharms 
1102). The claim under contention can be formulated with the following proposition: 
P4. The exposure to Bendectin caused the birth defects of Mary Virginia 
Oxendine. 
Supporting this proposition, the plaintiff uses the arguments provided by an expert in 
teratology called “Dr. Done.”5 He believes that (P4) because of four main lines of evidence: the 
structural activity of Bendectin, the results of some animal or in vivo studies, the conclusion of 
one in vitro experiment, and some human epidemiological data. With regards to Bendectin’s 
structure, (P4) is supported by three propositions (1104-1105): 
P5. Pharmacologists are “frequently able [...] to look at the structure [of a 
chemical compound] and predict what kind of activity that compound will 
have.” 
This, because it is generally known that, 
P6. Pharmacologists design drugs by doing (P5). 
Going back to the main line of the structural argument, Dr. Done also states,  
P7. It has been found that some antihistamines have teratogenic collateral effects. 
And, 
P8. One of the three components of Bendectin, doxylamine succinate, is an 
antihistamine. 
The defendant counterargues this reasoning insinuating that it is not sufficient for (P4), 
P9. “Considered alone, the structure-activity of Bendectin did not provide a basis 
for [the conclusion] that Bendectin was a teratogen.” 
                                                     
5
 ‘Teratology’ is defined as “the study of birth defects and malformations” (1104, note 3). 
28 
 
However, Dr. Done does not consider this argument in isolation. Indeed, this expert in both the 
direct examination and the counter-examination consents to (P9). Consequently, the plaintiff’s 
side provides three additional paths of reasoning. (P4) is also supported by in vivo studies (1105-
1106), 
P10. “they showed in my opinion evidence of teratogenicity in [mice and 
monkeys] and that would just be further evidence of the potential of the drug 
to produce defects.” 
Specifically, one study lead “by a Dr. Roll” shows the effects of doxylamine, one of Bendectin’s 
components, on mice and rats. Another study conducted “by a Dr. Hendricks” deals with the 
effects of Bendectin on monkeys. Reacting against (P10), the defendant alleged that in assessing 
collateral effects of drugs on humans, animal studies are not reliable and cannot be conclusively 
generalized to humans. Dr. Done agrees with that observation, but claims, 
P11. Human studies may be better than animal studies for predicting a drug’s 
effect on humans, but animal studies can be more controlled; this is an 
unquestionable advantage, from the scientific point of view. 
A third line of evidence is constituted by studies in vitro (1105-1106). Broadly speaking, 
these studies allow for the isolation of specific effects in a laboratory. In this case, a study 
conducted “by a Dr. Hassell” shows that,  
P12. Bendectin interfered with the growth and development of limb bud cells. 
Finally, Dr. Done analyzes more than twenty human epidemiological studies (1107-
1108). From his perspective, those studies show that,  
P13. There is a causal relation between the medicine and birth malformations. 
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Indeed, one of the studies reports that 48 percent of all Bendectin-related defects observed were 
limb defects. 
Dr. Done’s argument is understood from two opposing views that I will call the atomistic 
and the holistic interpretations. These positions perfectly contextualize the question taken into 
account in this section (i.e., “Whether and if so, when and why, a congeries of diverse pieces of 
evidence can warrant a conclusion better than any of its elements alone.”). The atomistic 
interpretation is made by the trial judge Joseph M. Mannon,  
In support of her case to establish proximate cause, plaintiff relies on four 
principal grounds. The first is the structural activity of Bendectin which included 
an antihistaminic component, together with the awareness that certain 
antihistamines have been determined to be teratogenic in certain animals. Plaintiff 
also relies on the animal or in vivo studies. The third ground involves the in vitro 
studies performed at the National Institutes of Health. Finally, plaintiff relies on 
human epidemiological data. 
It is clear to the Court from review of the evidence adduced at the trial of 
this action that no conclusion one way or another can be drawn from any of the 
above relied upon bases, respecting whether Bendectin is a human teratogen. And 
it is also clear from the evidence that plaintiff has failed to prove that use of 
Bendectin by her mother proximately caused her birth defect. (1102) 
This view tries to infer (P4) from the separate four lines of reasoning. Since none of the 
subarguments is sufficient for (P4), plaintiff allegations were found untenable.  
Disagreeing with this view, Judge Terry, who revised the case in appellation, states: 
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The court must view the evidence as a whole, not in fragments. Like the pieces of 
a mosaic, the individual studies showed little or nothing when viewed separately 
from one another, but they combined to produce a whole that was greater than the 
sum of its parts. (1110) 
This holistic interpretation of Dr. Done’s argument recognizes the insufficiency of each of his 
lines of reasoning. However, the evaluation is not limited to this fragmented analysis; better yet, 
it sees the connections between the lines of evidence. A conjoint evaluation of the evidence 
strengthens the argument. Therefore, the plaintiff’s allegations are tenable.  
Haack agrees with Judge Terry, but she thinks his mosaic metaphor does not provide an 
explanatory answer for the problem of conjoint evidence (“Warrant, Causation, and the Atomism 
of Evidence Law” 256). This issue can be better illuminated with an epistemic account. In doing 
this, LE should turn to the concept of justified belief. How justified is Dr. Done, at the trial, in 
believing (P4) depends upon how good his evidence for (P4) is. 
Haack proposes an analogy between a crossword puzzle and the evaluation of a body of 
evidence,  
How reasonable one’s confidence is that a certain entry in a crossword puzzle is 
correct depends on: how much support is given to this entry by the clue and any 
intersecting entries that have already been filled in; how reasonable, 
independently of the entry in question, one’s confidence is that those other 
already filled-in entries are correct; and how many of the intersecting entries have 
been filled in. Analogously, how good A’s [evidence] with respect to p is would 
depend on [supportiveness, independent security and comprehensiveness]. 
(Evidence and Inquiry 82) 
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To understand this analogy, a previous clarification is needed. Haack classifies evidence 
in two broad groups, namely, reasons and experiential evidence (Evidence and Inquiry 80; 
Defending Science 60-65). Reasons includes propositions that can be true or false. On the 
contrary, experiential evidence is only true propositions. This recognizes the importance of 
empirical experiences for knowledge, 
This is no reinstatement of any kind of infallibilism with respect to perceptual of 
introspective beliefs; it is just that the propositions concerned are to the effect that 
A is in such-and-such a perceptual (etc.) state, and they are all true because, ex 
hypothesi, A is in that perceptual (etc.) state. This feature guarantees what may be 
called the ‘experiential anchoring’ of justified empirical belief. (Evidence and 
Inquiry 81) 
To illustrate, assume Dr. Donereads the document where Dr. Hassen claims (P12). Then, 
Dr. Done is in a perceptual state that constitutes Dr. Done’s belief that (P12); for “Testimonial 
evidence, in a broad sense–what a person reads, what others tell him—enters the picture by way 
of his hearing or seeing or remembering, what someone else says or writes” (Haack, “A 
Foundherentist Theory of Empirical Justification” 137). Thisperceptual state can be stated as 
follows: 
(P 14) It looks to Dr. Done that Dr. Hassell states (P12). 
This very perceptual state is Dr. Done’s experiential evidence with respect to (P12). And, 
paraphrasing Haack, since a perceptual state cannot be part of the evidence unless Dr. Done is in 
this perceptual state, then (P14) is true (“A Foundherentist Theory of Empirical Justification” 
138). Additionally, (P14) is Dr. Done’s “anchor” for the external world. In contrast, (P12) can be 
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true or false. This last proposition is not experiential evidence, but a reason for (P4).These ideas 
are represented by the following diagram: 
 
Figure 2 Differences between Experiential Evidence and Reasons 
(P4) 
Ultimate belief 
 
 
(P12) 
Reason that can be true or false 
 
 
(P14) 
True proposition 
Anchor for the external world 
 
 
Dr. Hassel’s Actual Report 
 
Now we can go back to the crossword puzzle analogy. From Haack’s view, crossword 
puzzles’ clues are to crosswords as experiential evidence is to reasons. The first two terms of the 
analogy are in a relation such as that the clues do not need justification, but the crosswords need 
to be justified. This support is provided by the clues, intersecting entries that have already been 
filled and the independent reasonability of the crossword under consideration. Haack’s proposal 
is that experiential evidence does not need justification. It is always true. Reasons, contrarily, 
need some justification. They can be true or false. Therefore, as the clues, in a crossword puzzle, 
do not need justification, but confers justification to the crosswords, experiential evidence does 
not need justification, but it justifies reasons. 
This justification is provided when three criteria are fulfilled. First, with supportiveness, 
one evaluates the relation between the evidence(i.e., reasons and experiential evidence), and the 
conclusion, in Haack’s analogical terms, “how well [one crossword entry] fits with the clues and 
any intersecting entries” (64). In Dr. Done’s argument, (P4) fits with the experiential evidence 
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(P14), provided (P12). Second, in determining independent security, it is necessary to know how 
solid each of the elements of the evidence is. For instance, Dr. Done evaluates the independent 
security of (P10) with (P11). Finally, the evidence is comprehensive if it includes all the 
evidence collected, relevant or irrelevant. That is why Dr. Done includes (P9) in his argument. 
These factors are not, however, quite symmetrical. Increment of supportiveness 
raises the degree of warrant that joint evidence gives to a conclusion. Increment of 
independent security, however, raises degree of warrant if the evidence added is 
positive, but lowers degree of warrant if it is negative; and increment of 
comprehensiveness raises degree of warrant if the evidence added is at least as 
positive as the rest, but lowers degree of warrant if the additional evidence is 
negative, or less positive than the rest (257). 
This non-linear theory of justification seems to be more explanatory than the mosaic metaphor. 
Nonetheless, it does not solve properly the main problems of LE. In the next two sections, I will 
present my criticism. 
 
C. Science and Law: Two Different Cognitive Enterprises 
 
One of the central ideas of Haack’s LE is that the core values of law are conflicting 
resolution rather than truth seeking. This allows her to ignore certain questions (Q4 and Q5) and 
to answer others (Q1 – Q3). I believe Haack’s suggestion is wrong, for some of the premises of 
her argument are false. Specifically, I think (P1)is false, and although (P2)could be true, it is not 
because of the reasons provided by Haack. To be sure, it is possible to find activities whose aim 
is not inquiry, yet whose main values are epistemic. Moreover, when Haack assures that the aim 
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of law is not inquiry because it does not fit into the scientific inquiry, she confuses two types of 
cognitive enterprises. 
The falsehood of (P1) can be shown using the legal procedure as a counterexample. In 
accordance with Goldman, theories of legal procedure can take two forms—either they are 
pluralistic or unified (“Legal Evidence” 163-164). Pluralistic accounts hold that legal procedures 
have different aims, no one of which is prior to the other (e.g., fairness, justice, impartiality, 
allowing pacific coexistence, seeking the truth, protection of civil rights, etc.). Unified theories, 
in contrast, explain procedures with reference to one main end. They do not hold that legal 
procedures actually achieve the selected goal; better yet, they use it as an explanatory resource to 
clarify the main activities performed in legal procedures. Within this second alternative, one can 
find pure unified theories and impure unified theories. Pure accounts state that the legal practices 
taken into account are subsumable in one exclusive desideratum. Impure unified alternatives 
defend that although the aim of legal procedures is such an exclusive aim, it is possible to 
recognize alternative goals coexisting with the dominant rationale. 
Haack’s account is a good example of one unified pure theory, for she suggests the legal 
system’s aim is to resolve disputes deciding whether or not the defendant is guilty or liable. This 
desideratum leads her to exclude other values such as the seeking truth (“Irreconcilable 
Differences?” 12-13). One impure unified theory can be found in Goldman’s account. He thinks 
the aim of legal procedures is to secure “substantively just treatment of individuals.” This goal is 
only achieved if valid laws are correctly applied and the truth of the facts under litigation is 
achieved (“Legal Evidence” 164). Thus, the aim of law is not inquiry, but it does have epistemic 
values. Therefore, (P1) is false. 
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Why does Haack overlook law’s epistemic values? My intuitive answer is that Haack 
does not clarify the structure of the cognitive agent under consideration. As a consequence, she 
demands the law to perform activities for which it is not designed. Since the law does not do 
what science is supposed to do, the law does not have epistemic values. To expand, in taking into 
account the structure of a cognitive agent, a theory should include three elements: the agent’s 
cognitive target, the fulfillment requirements for that target, and the resources available for the 
goal at hand (Gabbay and Woods, “Logic and the Law” 175), that is, the information the agent 
has available, the time the agent has to achieve the objective, and the agent’s computational 
capacity (The Reach of Abduction 11). 
Assume Haack’s characterization of science is right. In this case, science’s cognitive task 
is inquiry. According to Haack, inquiry is formulating questions about the external world, 
looking for evidence, and providing answers for those questions. An example used by Haack 
clarifies this point. One of the most important scientific problems during the latter half of the 
twentieth century was “to solve the structure of DNA” (Haack, “Irreconcilable Differences?” 8). 
A scientific answer for that question not only has to be true, but also substantively explanatory. 
In other words, it ought to provide general laws, and it has to be the base for predictions. 
Accordingly, when James Watson and Francis Crick claimed that “the DNA is a double-helical, 
backbone-out macromolecule with like-with-unlike base pairs,” they did capture the actual 
structure of the DNA. Furthermore, it provides laws for molecular biology, and it allows for the 
future decoding of genetic information. Achieving that high cognitive task, and fulfilling such 
demanding conditions, science has the capability of commanding great resources. To illustrate, 
Watson and Crick’s DNA research group not only used the information provided by molecular 
biology at that moment, they also waited until the information was complete; for science does 
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not have time-constrictions. That is why scientific illations of information and calculations are 
powerful and precise. 
When Haack compares this amazing cognitive performance with the legal one, she gets 
frustrated. First, legal cognitive tasks depend upon non-epistemic objectives such as the 
protection of civil rights, or the constitutional admissibility of evidence. Second, standards, such 
as the proof beyond reasonable doubt, allow the law to move away from the truth. The problem 
is not whether or not X, actually, murdered Y, but if the prosecutor can justify, beyond 
reasonable doubt, such a claim. Third, the information in law is less abundant, and it is biased by 
the perspective of the parties under litigation. Moreover, procedural timelines constrict legal 
decisions in such a way that they have to be made with partial information. Additionally, legal 
agents’ reasoning in accordance to their client’s side, or juries not well-educated and easy to 
impress by the lawyers, limit law’s computational capacity. Because of this juxtaposition, Haack 
rules out that the law’s ultimate value is to seek the truth.  
Haack could replay that “this is not to deny that inquiry plays a role in the legal process 
[…] but it is to deny that inquiry is quite as central to the law as it is to science” (12-13). 
However, if someone asks for a positive account for the role of inquiry in legal procedure, or for 
the shape legal systems should adopt improving their cognitive methods,6 her answer is that it is 
beyond the scope of LE (“Epistemology Legalized” 61). Therefore, my intuition seems to be 
confirmed. She does not provide an account of the cognitive agent under consideration. Indeed, 
her claim that the core of law is “advocacy” is a consequence of a wrong generalization. She 
assumes the advocate’s perspective and defines all law from this angle:  
                                                     
6
 Goldman (“A Guide to Social Epsitemology” 19; “Legal Evidence.” 193; Knowledge in a 
Social World 272) and Laudan (Truth, Error and Criminal Law 2) suggest this is the main issue 
of LE. 
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The advocacy that is at the core of the adversarial process is a very different 
matter from inquiry […] the obligation of an attorney, qua advocate, is to make 
the best possible case for his client’s side of the dispute—including playing up the 
evidence that favors his case, and explaining inconvenient evidence away if he 
can’t get it excluded. (Irreconcilable Differences?” 13) 
Why should we privilege advocacy and not fact-finding, which is the obligation of juries, 
or investigation, which is the obligation of detectives? Haack does not have any answer to these 
questions. She adopts one perspective overlooking the complexity of legal procedures. 
Therefore, she does not offer an appropriate descriptive theory for legal knowledge. 
 
D. Disanalogies Between a Crossword Puzzle and Legal Knowledge 
 
A second problem for Haack’s LE is that she suggests a normative account for legal 
knowledge which is not sufficient for the epistemic evaluation of legal practices. This is a 
problem for the crossword puzzle analogy. My point is that it is possible to dissolve the analogy 
because legal epistemic practices have relevant properties that differentiate it from the practice of 
filling out a crossword puzzle. To show this, I will schematize Haack’s ideas with the following 
argumentative structure: 
P15.Ck and Cu have P1, P2 … Pn. 
P16.Ck also has P*. 
Therefore, by analogy, 
P17.Cuhas P* as well (Gustason 59). 
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Ck and Cu represent the cases that have been analogized. While Ck is a case whose relevant 
properties are known by the arguer, Cu still has unknown aspects. This deficiency will be 
supplied by the argument from analogy. P1, P2 … Pn stand for the properties that both Ck and Cu 
have. P* represents a property, or properties, that Ck has, and that is attributed to Cu, due to the 
resemblance between the cases (i.e., due to the properties they already have in common). In 
Haack’s argument, 
P18. A crossword puzzle and legal knowledge are gradationally justified, which 
means that they can be more or less justified. They are not linear. That is, 
they are neither instantiations of mathematical proof, nor are they justified 
in a reiterative chain of subordinate entries, or beliefs, respectively. Finally, 
neither a crossword puzzle’s clues, nor experiential evidence need 
justification. 
P19. In a crossword puzzle, an entry is justified when it is supported by a clue, it 
is independently reasonable, and it is supported by the entries already filled 
in. 
Therefore, by analogy, 
P20. In law, a belief is justified when it is supported by the experiential evidence, 
it is reasonable independently, and when it includes, both, all the evidence 
collected and other beliefs. 
Before evaluating this argument, I have to defend my strategy, for Haack could object to my 
methodology assuring, 
An analogy is only an analogy, not an argument. Its role is only to suggest ideas, 
which then have to stand on their own feet. And there are always disanalogies; 
39 
 
there will be nothing in my theory analogous to the solution of today’s crossword 
which appears in tomorrow’s newspaper, for instance, nor any analogue of the 
designer of a crossword. (“A Foundherentist theory of Empirical Justification” 
139) 
First, it is clear that an analogy is not necessarily an argument, but there are arguments 
whose conclusions are drawn from an analogy (Macagno, Reed and Walton 43-86). I believe this 
is Haack’s case, for this structure perfectly captures her original ideas expressed in Evidence and 
Inquiry (81-82). Second, I suppose that what Haack means is that her analogy is not a valid 
argument. I agree. Actually, I accept that arguments from analogy are not conclusive (i.e., they 
do not logically entail their conclusions). On the contrary, these arguments will be understood as 
instantiations of defeasible reasoning (Pollock 481). To clarify, arguments from analogy create a 
prima facie justification for their conclusions because of the apparent similitude between the 
cases related. This presumption could be ultima facie justified, either with new positively 
relevant information that corroborates the initial presumption, or with the absence of relevantly 
negative information that weakens the conclusion. Third, following the previous argument, I am 
committed to agree with the point that “there are always disanalogies.” Yet, I think a disanalogy 
only comes from relevant information, which is the information that either confirms or denies the 
argument’s conclusion. The claim that Haack’s crossword puzzle is unlike “today newspaper’s 
crossword puzzle” is irrelevant (i.e., it does not constitute a disanalogy). What really matters is 
whether or not the idea suggested by Haack’s analogy(i.e., in law a belief is justified when it is 
supported by the experiential evidence and other beliefs, when it is reasonably independent and 
when it includes all the evidence collected) “[stands] on their own feet” (“A Foundherentist 
theory of Empirical Justification” 139). And it depends upon relevant information. 
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I believe there are two arguments against Haack’s analogy. One attacks the prima facie 
positive properties that a crossword puzzle and a legal justified belief have in common; the other 
provides a negatively relevant property of legal knowledge that detaches it from crossword 
puzzles. Firstly, in Haack’s account it is not clear how experiential evidence, unlike a crossword 
puzzle’s clues, does not need justification. In Evidence and Inquiry, she states, “our ordinary 
ways of describing ‘the evidence of the senses’ offer some clues. What justifies me in believing 
that there is a woodpecker in the oak tree? – ‘my seeing it, the fact that I can see it’ is a natural 
answer” (80). Even though, this looks as a woodpecker to me, the mere stipulation that I am in a 
perceptual state does not explain why experiential evidence does not need justification. The 
canonical example of the novice and the expert illustrates this point. Imagine two individuals, an 
expert in identifying birds, and a novice in this art. The two of them state “there is a woodpecker 
in the oak tree.” Our inclination is that, whereas the expert is justified in his/her belief, the novice 
is not. However, Haack cannot explain this differentiation. Using her theory, the only thing we 
can trivially say is that the bird appeared a woodpecker for the two men. Therefore, whereas the 
crossword puzzle’s clues do not need justification, it is not clear why experiential evidence does 
not need justification.  
Secondly, there is an important difference between the cases analogized. The aim of a 
crossword puzzle is achieved when all its squares have been filled in with letters which are part 
of words that, both, correctly answer the clues, and fit together. In law, a justified belief held by 
a legal agent does not close the legal cognitive enterprise. On the contrary, a justified belief is the 
input for new epistemological activities. In Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharms, for example, the 
expert’s testimony that “The exposure to Bendectin caused the birth defects of Mary Virginia 
Oxendine” (1102) was one of the inputs for the trier of fact. The trier of fact had another 
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cognitive task, namely, determining whether or not Merrell Dow Pharms was liable for the birth 
defects of Mary Virginia Oxendine. This disanalogy is important because, as it was shown in 
Chapter 1, legal knowledge is not achieved by isolated individuals. It is the product of social 
interactions. A crossword puzzle does not require social interaction for being filled in. As a 
consequence, this is a second defeater for Haack’s analogy and her normative model of LE is 
untenable. This intuition will be clarified in the last Chapter of this paper. 
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IV. RELIABILISM AND LEGAL EPISTEMOLOGY 
 
The narrow view of Haack’s LE contrasts with the diversity of epistemic questions with 
which Goldman’s LE deals. From his view, LE not only provides some clarification for (Q1) and 
(Q3), it also provides substantial answers for (Q2), (Q4) and (Q5). Indeed, Goldman thinks LE 
can tackle other questions such as: 
Q6. “How should legal systems channel the flow of information about particular 
cases so as to produce suitable judgments about those cases?” (Knowledge in 
a Social World272) 
Q7. “How [do] various factors of adjudication procedures affect the fact finder’s 
success or failure at identifying the relevant material facts” (273-274)? 
Q8. “What degrees of accuracy [will] various adjudication systems […] promote” 
(279)? 
Q9. “How well [does] each [legal] procedure [(i.e., inquisitorial or adversarial 
systems of adjudication)], or each small group of procedures, function for the 
search for truth” (290)? 
Q10. “How can legal systems get the parties to disclose evidence relevant to their 
case” (300)? 
Q11. “Which evidence rules ought to be adopted”(“Legal Evidence” 163)? 
To be sure, the problem of epistemic justification associated with (Q1) is illuminated by 
Goldman’s reliabilism. From this view, the issue is not whether a legal agent’s belief is justified 
by the evidence, as Haack presents it, but how reliable are belief-forming procedures in the field 
of law. In some sense, Haack’s evidentialist perspective is trivial because legal agents always 
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have to justify their decisions with legal evidence. In addition, the fact that a legal agent’s belief 
is justified by legal evidence is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for legal knowledge, for 
“although [legal evidence] sometimes coincides with the truth, it need not do so” (Goldman, 
Knowledge in a Social World 283). 
Goldman also suggests that (Q3) is resolved by a reliabilist approach of LE. Here, 
Bayesian updating of beliefs, coherent explanations, simple heuristics, and other processes of 
inference used in the field of law should be assessed for their reliability to produce truth beliefs 
(“Simple Heuristics and Legal Evidence”218-220). 
This goal-oriented approach is also useful to grasp legal institutions such as those 
included in (Q2). Broadly speaking, since one of the main goals of legal procedure is the truth 
determination, legal institutions can be understood through the epistemic goals they promote. For 
instance, “the evidence standard of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ is imposed in the criminal law 
because certain kinds of verdict errors are regarded as more serious than other kinds: convictions 
of the innocent are worse errors than acquittals of guilty” (Knowledge in a Social World 284). 
Goldman, unlike Haack, thinks (Q4) and (Q5) are epistemically answerable. To recall, 
what prevents Haack from providing a response for these questions is her misconception that 
legal systems have a unique aim (i.e., the peaceful resolution of social conflicts) that exclude 
other desiderata such as seeking the truth. Goldman, on the contrary, thinks epistemic aims are 
an essential part of legal systems, even if they are not their ultimate goal. To clarify, Goldman 
suggests that even though the exclusionary rules of evidence contradict some epistemic 
principles, they could be illuminated from an epistemic account. Practically, the truth-in-
evidence principle states that when more true evidence is collected, there is a better indication of 
the truth of the hypothesis under consideration (Knowledge in a Social World 292). Such a 
44 
 
principle is threatened by the exclusionary rules of evidence that allow the diminishment of 
information presented by the litigants. To be sure, FRE stipulate: 
Rule 403. Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of Prejudice, 
Confusion, or Waste of Time 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, 
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
This rule combines epistemic values (e.g., the tracking of the topic under consideration) with 
values of other kinds (e.g., timeline constrictions in protecting civil rights). LE is able to evaluate 
the epistemic aims that the lawmaker intended to insert in the exclusionary rules of evidence. 
Hence, protecting juries from confusion of issues or avoiding biased perceptions of evidence 
could be good epistemic reasons to exclude some evidence (Goldman, Knowledge in a Social 
World 293; “Legal Evidence” 168). 
Goldman’s approach not only evaluates actual institutions such as the inquisitorial and 
the adversarial systems of adjudication, (Q9) and (Q8), and shows how legal institutions’ designs 
impact the epistemic performance of legal agents, (Q7), but this theory also provides methods to 
improve legal systems, (Q6) and (Q11), and, as a consequence, legal epistemic practices 
(Q10).The richness of Goldman’s LE is a consequence of the application of both his reliabilist 
GE and his social LE. The original way in which these epistemologies are combined will be 
presented in the next section. After this, the weakness of this theory will be exposed, namely, its 
lack of epistemic evaluations for the individual performances of legal agents. 
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A. The Nature of Epistemic Justification in the Field of Law 
 
How is justificatory status conferred in the field of law? To answer this question, some 
terminology must be understood. Theories of justification are accounts that specify the 
conditions under which a person is justified in believing (Goldman, “What is Justified Belief?” 
334). Consequently, a theory of justification adopts the next structure: 
S is justified in believing that p if and only if: 
C1 
C2 
 ... 
Cn 
In this structure, S stands for a cognitive agent, p for a fact or proposition, and C1 … Cn are the 
conditions for justificatory status. 
As a first approximation, Goldman suggests that: 
S is justified in believing that p if and only if: 
C: p results from a reliable cognitive process. 
Two concepts need to be clarified, specifically, “reliable” and “cognitive process.” Goldman 
defines cognitive process as a function with inputs that have beliefs as outputs (“What is 
Justified Belief?” 339). Two types of processes are important here. Firstly, the belief-dependent 
processes have other beliefs as inputs. Secondly, the belief-independent processes do not have 
other beliefs as inputs. Perception is an example of belief-independent processes. Reasoning, 
which includes antecedent beliefs within their premises is an instance of belief-dependent 
processes. Following this terminology, Goldman introduces more distinctions. There are two 
46 
 
kinds of beliefs. A belief-independent belief is the output of a belief-independent process. A 
belief-dependent belief is the result of a belief-dependent process. A final concept is necessary, 
“reliability consists of the tendency of a process to produce beliefs that are true rather than false” 
(What is Justified Belief?” 338). While in belief-dependent processes reliability depends on the 
truth of the inputs (i.e., it is conditional), in belief-independent processes, reliability is 
categorical. From these distinctions, reliabilism suggests two forms for evaluating justificatory 
status. 
The first form is for the belief-independent processes: 
S is justified in believing that p if and only if: 
C1: p is a belief-independent belief, and 
C2: p is the result of a categorically reliable process. 
The second form is for the belief-dependent processes: 
S is justified in believing that p if and only if: 
C1: p is a belief-dependent belief, and 
C2: p is the result of a conditional reliable process. 
If my interpretation of Goldman’s ideas is not wrong, legal knowledge is a type of belief-
dependent process. This formula captures the core of my interpretation: 
A legal agent is justified in holding an epistemic judgment (j), in a legal 
procedure (lp), if and only if: 
C1: j depends on the procedural interventions of other participants in a lp. 
C2: j is the result of the truth-conduciveness of lp. 
I will explain the two conditions for legal knowledge below, but a previous distinction is 
required. Goldman states, “Notice that I am speaking of judgments rather than beliefs … The 
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reason for this deviation is that the palpable outputs of legal deliberations are not private beliefs 
but public judgments of guilt and innocence, liability or non liability” (Knowledge in a Social 
World 272).This is an important distinction between GE and LE. While the former studies 
epistemic justification independently of actual justifications of legal agents in dialectic scenarios, 
the latter is concerned with epistemic justifications publicly justified in legal contexts. Therefore, 
for Goldman, legal argumentation is a constitutive part of LE. 
To continue, legal agents do not perceive the facts under litigation directly; rather, they 
form their judgments from different sources of legal knowledge. To mention the most common 
examples, the presumed fact that “Y was murdered by X” is not perceived by the detective who 
looks for relevant evidence that establishes whether X murdered Y. Neither the prosecutor who 
publically accuses X of murder, nor X’s attorney perceived the fact under litigation. Instead, they 
build their respective versions of the case with information provided by their side’s detectives, 
witnesses, material evidence, and the like. Finally, the trier of facts—judge or jury—does not 
perceive the alleged facts. On the contrary, he/she receives the information from the witnesses 
who are examined and counter-examined at trial. As a consequence, j depends on the procedural 
interventions of other participants in lp. 
If j depends on the procedural interventions of other participants in lp, then j is not 
required to be categorically reliable, but conditionally reliable. In other words, the truth of j 
depends on the truth of its inputs. Three examples proposed by Goldman illustrate types of cues 
that juries find very probative (“Simple Heuristic and Legal Evidence”221). First, imagine a 
witness identification testimony where the witness points the finger at the defendant and states 
“this is the one.” With this information, the trier of facts would probably decide that X murdered 
Y if the witness pointed at X. However, identifications are not 100% accurate. Witnesses also 
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make mistakes, and this failure is transferred to the fact-finders’ decision. Second, when a person 
confesses that he/she did the crime under inquiry, a judge or a jury tend to believe that the person 
who confessed actually did the crime. Yet, some confessions are produced by police intimidation 
or by the possibility of a plea bargain that ends in a negotiation with less serious crime charges 
for the offender. If X confesses that he murdered Y when he did not do it, all legal judgments 
drawn from X’s confession will not be true. Finally, when a technical clarification is needed to 
understand the alleged facts, the trier of facts will rely on expert testimonies. Since one of the 
most important criteria for accepting an expert assertion is the credibility that the expert witness 
has, some inaccurate expert testimonies are incorporated into legal judgments. Ultimately, the 
credibility an expert has is not an epistemic criterion (i.e., it is not related to the seeking the 
truth). To conclude, “we cannot expect any [inferential process in the field of law] to make 
correct (truthful) inferences if its inputs or premises are substantially inaccurate. ‘Garbage in, 
garbage out’, as the saying goes” (“Simple Heuristic and Legal Evidence” 219). 
Due to the fact that lp is conditionally reliable, the accuracy of legal knowledge depends 
upon the truth-value of the interventions inputted in the judgment-forming process. Besides, 
because one of “the core missions of [the law] is to elevate community levels of truth possession, 
information possession, knowledge possession, or possession of justified rational [judgments]” 
(“A Guide to Social Epistemology” 19), the law has to take care of its inputs minimizing their 
inaccuracy. How can those sources of knowledge be controlled? Goldman suggests that inputs 
can be controlled with the appropriate design of legal systems. Since the law is an epistemic 
system (i.e., a social system that houses social practices, procedures, institutions and/or patterns 
of interpersonal influence that affect the epistemic outcome of its members), it can control the 
epistemic interactions of legal agents. Legal systems poorly designed will allow for the 
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introduction of inaccurate inputs, and will output wrong judgments. Therefore, j is the result of 
the truth-conduciveness of lp. 
Even though the elements for legal epistemic evaluations have been established, I think 
the conditions for legal knowledge are not sufficient. I agree that judgment-cognitive processes 
in the field of law are conditionally reliable. However, the attaining of legal knowledge not only 
depends upon the appropriate design of legal institutions, but also the epistemic performance of 
legal agents is essential. Before developing my criticism, I will reconstruct a second part of 
Goldman’s account that is quite important for the issue of this paper. Goldman thinks legal 
epistemic evaluations themselves are a domain of social epistemology. Now I will explore the 
arguments that justify this methodological option. 
 
B. Social Legal Epistemology, Again 
 
As it has been previously stated, Goldman claims that LE is a domain of social 
epistemology. His argument runs as follows:  
P21. Epistemic practices are performed either individually or socially. 
P22. If epistemic practices are performed individually, then they should be 
evaluated by individual epistemology. 
P23. If epistemic practices are performed socially, then they should be evaluated 
by social epistemology. 
Therefore, 
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P24. Epistemic practices should be evaluated either by social or individual 
epistemology, but it is not the case that epistemic practices should be 
evaluated by both social and individual epistemology. 
P25. Legal epistemic practices are not performed individually. 
Therefore, 
P26. Legal epistemic practices should be evaluated by social epistemology, and 
not by individual epistemology. 
(P21) is an inclusive disjunction. For this proposition to be true requires at least one of its 
disjuncts to be true. The first disjunct, ‘epistemic practices are performed individually’, is true, 
for individuals realize activities in seeking knowledge. Epistemic activities are performed 
socially as well; for instance, communities of scientists work together for the achievement of 
knowledge. Therefore, (P21) is true. 
Arguing for the truth of (P22) and (P23) requires recalling the different methodological 
emphasis of, both, individual and social epistemology. While the first focuses on mental states of 
isolated agents, the second cares about truth-conducive institutions. Hence, each kind of 
epistemology seems to accurately understand a different object. 
The objects of epistemic evaluation are cognitive processes, structures and 
mechanisms. But this only touches individual epistemology […] Social 
epistemology is concerned with the truth-getting impact of different patterns and 
arrangements of social intercourse. (Goldman, Epsitemology and Cognition 5) 
Therefore, (P22) and (P23) are true. 
There are two approaches for the study of knowledge, “Epistemology, as I conceive it, 
divides into two parts: individual epistemology and social epistemology” (Goldman, 
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Epistemology and Cognition 1). When seeking knowledge is a solitary activity, individual 
epistemology is deployed. In contrast, if more than one person is required for epistemic 
practices, social epistemology should be implemented. 
Traditional epistemology, taking its cue from Descartes, focused exclusively on 
the individual cognitive agent, construed as a solitary inquirer into nature. Social 
epistemology, by contrast, asks how groups of communities of agents can best 
pool their evidence-gathering resources and profit from dialectical exchange and 
debate (Goldman and Talbott 99). 
Therefore, (P24) is true. 
The most important arguments for the truth of (P25) were presented in Chapter 1. To 
recall, legal knowledge is achieved by legal agents who have different and complementary 
cognitive tasks. In the adversarial system of adjudication, the parts under litigation look for the 
relevant evidence, and the trier of facts decides whether or not the alleged facts occurred. This 
inquiry is fed by eyewitnesses, experts, detectives, and so on. They have the role of providing the 
relevant information that triggered cognitive processes in the field of law. That is why Goldman 
commits himself with the claim that LE is entirely social. 
The law features highly codifies systems and procedures in which multiple 
players interact to produce certain judgments, namely, verdicts. Since one of the 
central aims of these procedures, I shall argue, is to produce true or accurate 
judgments, it is natural to evaluate existing procedures along the veritistic 
dimension. This is the appropriate task, at any rate, for social epistemology 
(Knowledge in a Social World 272). 
This is to state (P26). 
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I belief propositions (P21) – (P23) are true. However, (P24) is false. Although (P25) is 
true, it could lead to some wrong practical consequences which, with the incorrectness of (P24), 
draw a wrong conclusion. As it was shown in Chapter 1, LE should study the cognitive 
achievements of both legal agents and legal institutions, and social epistemology does not take 
into account legal agents. Therefore, (P26) is unacceptable. My arguments will be presented 
below. 
 
C. Individual Epistemology v. Social Epistemology: A False Dilemma 
 
My thesis is that Goldman’s conditions for legal knowledge are not sufficient. 
Additionally, the distinction between social and individual epistemology is supported by a false 
dilemma. I intuit that this second point leads to the first one. Therefore, I will attack the horns of 
this dilemma first. 
The issue is: Why does this argument infer the exclusive disjunction (P24) from the 
inclusive disjunction (P21), plus (P22) and (P23)? In other words, if epistemic practices are 
performed individually and socially, why should one dichotomize when dealing with knowledge 
(i.e., either individual or social epistemology)? The problem resides in the method for choosing 
the object of epistemic evaluation. In the argument, the difference between individual- and 
social-cognitive practices is aggregative. Because the isolated cognitive agents are the focal point 
of individual epistemology, it does not study aggregations and interactions of cognitive agents. 
Conversely, because social epistemology focuses on the collective process of knowledge and on 
the truth-conduciveness of social institutions, individual cognitive agents are beyond its scope of 
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action. I think the number of cognitive agents is an irrelevant factor for epistemic evaluations. 
What really matters is the failure or the success in the achievement of knowledge. 
It could be objected that my diagnosis is wrong because there are cases in which 
individual practices of knowledge are taken into account by Goldman’s theory. My answer is 
that these practices only matter to social epistemology when they are components of the 
aggregative process. Therefore, the epistemic performance of individual cognitive agents is not 
evaluated by Goldman’s LE. His words illustrate my point: 
The contrast between individual and social epistemology, plus the way I 
characterize individual epistemology, may make it sound as if mental operations 
fall outside the province of social epistemology. That is not so […] the way an 
agent reasons from the reports, testimony, and arguments of others belongs to the 
field of social epistemology. In a sense, then, individual and social epistemology 
are not sharply exclusive branches of epistemology. However, the bulk of the 
practices subsumed under social epistemology fall outside individual 
epistemology. (Knowledge in a Social World 4, note 1) 
Even though Goldman remarks that the concepts of legal and social epistemology have a degree 
of ambiguity, he thinks “the bulk of the practices subsumed under social epistemology fall 
outside individual epistemology.” Legal-cognitive practices are subsumed in social 
epistemology. Therefore, legal-cognitive practices fall outside individual epistemology. As a 
consequence, legal epistemic practices cannot be studied from the perspective of legal agents. 
This viewpoint is an ‘internal’ one, a viewpoint appropriate to a certain role-
player in the system […] The question we are presently pursuing is ‘external’ to 
any given adjudication system. It looks at whole systems and compares them with 
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rivals. When such an external stance is taken, we cannot appeal to an internal 
component of a system as a criterion. (283) 
However, Goldman’s external point of view does not suffice to evaluate the acquisition of 
knowledge in the field of law. Although Goldman assesses the impact of legal institutions in the 
epistemic performance of legal agents, he overlooks the impact that legal agents have in legal 
systems. As it was shown in Chapter 2, the point of view of each participant in legal procedures 
not only enriches the field of law, but also makes possible the achievement of its objectives (e.g., 
the fact-finder determination is impossible without the work of diligent advocates who collect 
and evaluate the information required). Goldman minimizes the importance of individual 
participants in legal procedures; for this reason, this view focuses on the aims of legal procedures 
and not on the epistemological practices of legal agents. There are two practical interpretations 
of (P25). 
P251. Since legal epistemological practices are not performed individually, 
actions of individual legal agents are irrelevant. 
P252. Although legal epistemological practices are not performed individually, the 
actions of individual legal agents are relevant. 
It seems to me that Goldman adopts (P251) because he does not take into account the epistemic 
performance of legal agents. That is why he infers (P26). I disagree. My strategy to deny this 
conclusion is to dissolve the dilemma in which Goldman’s argument is supported. Such a 
criticism is possible if I provide a concept of legal-cognitive agent which includes both 
individual and social epistemological practices, but that does not dichotomize between individual 
and social cognitive practices. To be sure, previously I suggested that the inference from (P21) – 
(P23) to (P24) is possible because of the aggregative difference between individual-cognitive 
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practices and social-cognitive practices. Besides, I pointed out that although (P25) is true, 
individual epistemological practices are important for LE, (P252). Therefore, a non-dichotomist 
the concept of cognitive agent which considers the individual and social epistemic practices is 
required. Providing this concept of LE will capture my attention in the last part of this paper. 
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V. COGNITIVE AGENDAS AND LEGAL EPISTEMOLOGY 
 
In the previous chapter, I suggested that Goldman’s conditions for legal knowledge are 
not sufficient. Even though, both, the social nature of legal knowledge is correctly recognized by 
the first condition, and legal institutions are correctly prioritized by the second condition, 
Goldman’s LE cannot evaluate the impact of legal agents’ performance in the general legal-
epistemic enterprise. This failure is shown by Goldman’s inaccurate answer for some of the main 
concerns of LE. Practically, answering (Q1) and (Q3), Goldman focuses on the reliability of the 
procedure through which the inputs of information, or legal evidence, are processed to produce 
legal judgments. If the information is true and the legal procedure is truth-conducive, then legal 
judgments are true. Goldman takes for granted that legal agents, given the appropriate design of 
legal procedures, always process information correctly. But this is not the case. Legal agents 
make mistakes when processing information. Additionally, they do not perform their cognitive 
tasks with the same degree of efficiency as their peers.  Goldman lacks both a theory of error and 
a method for the evaluation of the performance of legal agents. 
I infer this problem can be faced by a theory that includes the perspective of legal agents 
into the institutional analysis. Yet, this intuition has a risk. Participant-oriented evaluations could 
be circular because they intend to assess legal systems with a constitutive element of the systems 
under evaluation. Goldman states, “When such an [institutional] stance is taken, we cannot 
appeal to an internal component of a system as a criterion. We first need a criterion appropriate 
to the choice of a system, and a component already built into a system (or even several systems) 
is inappropriate” (Knowledge in a Social World 283).Goldman avoids this circularity with his 
goal-oriented approach. Legal systems are aimed to achieve epistemic objectives. Whether or not 
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they achieve their epistemic aims is a non-circular criterion of evaluation because it does not take 
into account any element of the legal system as a variable in the evaluation. 
I suspect that it is possible to combine a participant-oriented approach with a goal-
oriented one. In Chapter 1, I state legal agents are neither plain individual, nor pure institutions. 
They are embedded into institutional purposes. Therefore, institutions dictate to legal agents 
what cognitive tasks they should do and how they should do them. Their goal is to realize those 
programs of action in such a way that the system discharges them from their commitments. How 
is this possible? They have to function properly, in accordance with their cognitive agendas. This 
means that legal agents can also be evaluated with a non-circular and goal-oriented perspective. I 
will explore this possibility in some detail in this last chapter. I have a theoretic ally for this 
journey, namely, the Practical Logic of Cognitive Systems (PLCS). 
To recall, PLCS defines “logic as the disciplined description of the behavior of real-life 
logical agents” (Gabbay and Woods, The Reach of Abduction 1) and an “agent” as a kind of 
“information-processor” (Gabbay and Woods, Agenda Relevance 185) with a cognitive agenda 
or “program of action”, that he/she is constrained to close (Gabbay and Woods, The Reach of 
Abduction 11). Additionally, the aim of PLCS is to describe the real conditions under which a 
cognitive agent deals with his/her resources (time, information and computational capacity) to 
close his/her cognitive agendas (10). I will deploy this theory below. 
 
A. Legal-Cognitive Agency 
 
I already show that legal agents are information processors. They process the information 
provided by other legal agents (inputs) and transform them in judgments (outputs). To illustrate, 
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detectives process the information provided by eyewitnesses to build a robust case for the 
prosecutor. The prosecutor, using the information provided by the detectives, presents publically 
his accusation to one tribunal. The jury listens to the witnesses, the prosecutor, and the defense at 
trial deciding if the alleged facts occurred. Now an extra qualification for legal agents is needed. 
There are two factors that determine the different types of cognitive agents (Gabbay and 
Woods, The Reach of Abduction. 11). Firstly, the degree of command of resources (time, 
information and computational capability) an agent needs to advance or close his/her agendas. 
Secondly, the height of the cognitive bar that the agent has set for him/herself. With this in mind, 
this PLCS incorporates a hierarchical approach to agency. It postulates a hierarchy in which 
agents are placed in light of their interests and their capacities. Individuals are placed towards the 
bottom of the hierarchy and institutions higher up (see figure 3). While “humans perform their 
cognitive tasks on the basis of less information and less time than they might otherwise like to 
have”, the institutional entities “can wait long enough to make a try for total information, and 
they can run the calculations that close their agendas both powerfully and precisely” (11-12). 
 
Figure 3 Hierarchy of Cognitive Agents 
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Where should legal agents be placed? My view is that, in the terms of the hierarchy, they 
are neither pure individuals nor highly ranked institutional entities (i.e., theoretical agents). 
Consequently, they are institutional agents with epistemic limitations. This means they are 
placed higher than individuals, but in a lower level within the institutions that have epistemic 
goals. To be sure, a legal agent commands more cognitive resources than an individual. What is 
expected in the adversarial system of adjudication is that the litigants, with the incentive of 
wining the case, look for all the relevant information for the legal inquiry. Additionally, they 
work in teams of inquirers, witnesses, and experts who seek to make their versions of the case 
stronger. The idea is that these parallel inquiries exhaust all the relevant information to be 
known. Inquisitorial systems also have high expectations. In this case, the official in charge of 
finding relevant information is supported by institutional corps of investigation. Since the 
litigants do not handle evidence, the inquiry is not biased by their respective positions. 
Another important difference between an individual and a legal agent is the cognitive aim 
they are disposed to achieve. Legal procedures have a high cognitive aim, namely, to determine 
the truth of the events under litigation. Legal agents serve this goal in different ways. This is true 
even for litigants who apparently only serve their respective side’s interests. When they take part 
in a legal inquiry, their vantage point clarifies aspects of the events that are inaccessible by the 
officials. Individuals, on the contrary, are not always interested in the truth. This explains why 
individuals are naturally hasty generalizers, or why they do not always use truth-preserving 
strategies of reasoning (The Reach of Abduction 23-25). 
Even though legal agents are ranked higher than individuals, they are not perfect 
inquirers such as scientific groups (e.g., NASA), as Haack wishes. Since legal inquiries have 
strong timeline constrictions, they make decisions with incomplete and partial information. 
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Furthermore, in matter of facts, legal systems expect legal agents to reason as individuals and not 
as experts. Experts take part in legal discussions as qualified witnesses, but they are not able to 
make the ultimate decision. The institution of the jury in adversarial systems illustrates this point. 
Prima facie, any citizen can be part of the jury, unless he/she has expert knowledge about the 
actual issues under consideration. Given this case, the jury is excluded. Alternatively, in legal 
systems in which the fact finder should be an educated citizen, what is expected is that such a 
qualified citizen be educated in the law, but not in factual matters such as forensic science. To 
sum up, legal agents have the computational capacity of an average person, or a reasonable 
person (Woods 226). Therefore, they are ranked lower within the institutions, but higher than 
individuals. 
 
B. Legal-Cognitive Agendas 
 
Even though legal systems set cognitive goals by themselves (e.g., the discovery of the 
truth), as Goldman states, they cannot autonomously attain these objectives. Instead, legal agents 
put the system into operation. I believe the main failure of Goldman’s LE is to overcome this 
important role of legal agents. A couple of obvious examples illuminate my point. It is not the 
law of evidence (e.g., FRE) by itself that determines the truth of the events under litigation. On 
the contrary, the trier of facts, either a judge or a jury, is responsible for such an important 
decision. In the same way, the rules about the use of expert testimony (e.g., Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals) do not select and present experts at trial, but the litigants are who 
introduce such a scientific discourse in order to strengthen their respective versions of the case. 
Consequently, legal systems depend upon legal agents. Using Laudan’s metaphor, legal systems 
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are epistemic engines that are triggered and handled by legal agents. Let me explain this 
codependence in detail. 
One can understand legal procedures as timelines whose endpoints are verdicts of guilt or 
innocence in criminal cases, and liability or non-liability in civil cases. Verdicts are produced 
when different conditions are satisfied. In western legal systems, the verdict comes after a trial. 
Similarly, the trial starts once the inquirer (i.e., the litigants in adversarial procedures and the 
judge in inquisitorial ones) analyzes the information available. Some of the verdict’s necessary 
conditions are epistemic. For instance, in criminal procedures, a verdict of guilt is only possible 
when the prosecutor can justify the accusation beyond reasonable doubt. Besides, the evidence 
presented at trial should be relevant. Alternatively, some of the verdict’s necessary conditions are 
not epistemic. For example, a verdict has to be proffered even if the judge does not have enough 
information. Equally, relevant information has to be excluded if it is obtained without following 
legal protocols of protection of civil rights. 
Since the achievement of legal epistemic goals depends on legal agents’ performance, 
legal systems regulate the activities to be realized by legal agents. In other words, legal systems 
impose cognitive agendas, or programs of action, on legal agents. The closure of those programs 
of action guarantees the seeking of the truth, which is the ultimate legal epistemic goal. The 
achievement of this desideratum is progressive and flexible. It is progressive for two reasons. 
First, procedural timelines are designed in such a way that the legal inquiry starts with some 
clues and indications that trigger the activities of detectives, and ends with the judicial 
determination of the facts under litigation. Second, it is also progressive because the accurate 
cognitive performance of a legal agent who intervenes in an initial procedural stage (e.g., pretrial 
stages) makes possible the interventions of other legal agents who intervene in posterior 
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procedural stages (e.g., trial or appeal). For instance, a prosecutor’s defense of a public 
accusation presupposes a detective’s identification of a suspect and the factual verification of the 
legal conditions for the existence of a crime. The achievement of legal epistemic goals is flexible 
because there is not a unique way to close legal epistemic agendas. On the contrary, several 
strategies can be adopted. To illustrate, the identification of a suspect is a target that can be 
reached in parallel ways such as the testimony of eyewitnesses, a victim’s identification parade, a 
forensic analysis of DNA, or even a confession. 
Paraphrasing Gabbay and Woods’s ideas, a legal-cognitive agenda is a cognitive mapping 
from known legal hypothesis to proven legal states of affairs (Agenda Relevance 211). The 
knowledge of a legal state of affairs under consideration constitutes a cognitive-procedural 
constraint for the legal agent to whom the agenda has been set. He/she is only discharged from 
such a commitment when the legal hypothesis is known. For instance, the main procedural 
constrain for jurors in adversarial criminal procedures is to decide whether or not the 
prosecutor’s accusation (e.g., X is guilty of murdering Y) is justified beyond reasonable doubt. 
Advancing this agenda, jurors have to interpret and assess the evidence presented at trial 
wondering whether or not X had a motive and the opportunity to murder Y (legal hypotheses to 
be known). This last task is only possible when the jurors listen to the witnesses’ examination 
and cross-examination, and to the prosecutor’s and defense’s opening and closing statements 
(Woods 217). 
My view is that legal epistemology not only should evaluate the truth-conduciveness of 
legal procedures, but also should verify that the cognitive agendas that legal systems impose on 
legal agents are closed properly. An appropriate design of legal systems both sets proper 
cognitive objectives to be achieved and provides adequate cognitive recourses to legal agents; 
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but this is not enough. Legal agents should close their cognitive agendas within the correct time 
and processing the required information in accordance with the legal necessities. This is why I 
suggest completing the conditions for legal knowledge as follows: 
A legal agent is justified in holding an epistemic judgment (j), in a legal 
procedure (lp), if and only if: 
C1: j depends on the procedural interventions of other participants in lp. 
C2: j is the result of the truth-conduciveness of lp. 
C3: j is the appropriate closure of a legal-cognitive agenda. 
 
C. Conclusion 
 
Even though the theory I am endorsing is not complete, I have established the 
foundations for future explorations. The intuitive answers that this account provides for the legal 
epistemic problems mentioned in this paper indicate that this account isa fertile landfor future 
research. 
(Q1) depends upon the concept of cognitive agenda. Evidence should be understood in 
relation to the agenda a determined agent intends to close or advance. Legal evidence constitutes 
the required information for legal agents to perform their cognitive tasks. General epistemic 
evidence is mostly understood as the information an individual needs to know for his/her normal 
epistemic activities. 
(Q2) includes legal concepts that characterize the cognitive agendas to be closed in legal 
procedures. For example, the concept of reasonable doubt qualifies two agendas to be closed, 
namely, the prosecutor’s and the jury’s. While the prosecutor has to justify his accusation beyond 
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reasonable doubt, the jury has to verify whether or not the prosecutor’s argumentation fulfills 
this standard. In addition, it is not expected that either the prosecutor or the jury compute 
information beyond the capability of a reasonable men. 
Processes of reasoning such as Bayesian inference or coherent histories are subparts of 
legal-cognitive agendas, (Q3). In accordance with FRE (Rule 401) for a judge to determine 
whether a piece of evidence is relevant (legal states of affairs to be proved), Bayesian inference 
seems to be appropriate (legal state of affairs under consideration). Similarly, when litigants 
present their versions of the alleged facts, it is expected their witnesses’ stories are coherent. 
(Q4) can be answered by understanding that legal systems have epistemic agendas (e.g., 
seeking for the truth) and non-epistemic, or decisional, agendas (e.g., protecting civil rights) 
(Gabbay and Woods, The Reach of Abduction 257). On one hand, the object of the epistemic 
evaluations of the adversarial system is its cognitive agendas, as Goldman correctly claims. On 
the other hand, the fact that adversarial systems have non-epistemic agendas does not rule out the 
philosophical evaluation of its cognitive agendas, as Haack wrongly suggests. 
Some of the exclusionary rules of evidence, (Q5), are an important part of law’s seeking 
the truth. One necessary condition for this desideratum is the elution of error. With this in mind, 
“the court’s agenda is to avoid wrong conviction” (Gabbay and Woods, The Reach of Abduction 
255). This agenda is closed excluding irrelevant evidence, for example. 
(Q6) – (Q10) are problems of design and evaluation of legal-cognitive agendas and 
subagendas, the most important suggestion of Goldman’s LE. To illustrate, when a fact finder 
have inadequate resources for the cognitive task the system assigns to him, he/she will fail at 
identifying the relevant material facts (Q7). 
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